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Competing Concepts of Immunity:
The (R)evolution of the Head of State
Immunity Defense
Paul J. Toner*
I am an idealistwithout illusions.- John Fitzgerald Kennedy
I.

Introduction

A defense of Head of State immunity,' whether at an international
tribunal or in a nation-state court, became increasingly limited during the
latter half of the twentieth century. 2 However, the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ"), in its February 2002 Congo v. Belgium3 decision,
seemingly halted the trend towards greater accountability for crimes that
offend international norms. In Congo, the ICJ held that a foreign
minister is immune from prosecution for all and any crimes, whether
committed during or prior to assuming his or her official capacity, so

* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2004; B.A., International Relations and History, St. Joseph's University,
2001; Research Assistant, The Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2001; John A. Baker
Intern, The Atlantic Council of the United States, 2000.
The author wishes to thank Michael Jonik for his thoughtful comments on and
suggestions for this Comment. In addition, the author wishes to thank Kimberly Selemba
and Nicole Hartley for their assistance in editing this Comment, and a special thanks to
all of my friends at the CAJ for keeping me focused.
1. "Immunity" is the common shorthand phrase for "immunity from jurisdiction."
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), 2002 1.C.J.
121, § 2 (Feb. 14) (Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Buergenthal) [hereinafter Congo v. Belgium].
2. Adam Isaac Hasson, Note, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionand Sovereign Immunity
on Trial: Noriega, Pinochet, and Milosevic-Trends in Political Accountability and
Transnational Criminal Law, 25 B.C. INT'L & COmpv.L. REv. 125, 157-58 (2002)
(arguing that "[d]ue to the actions in cases surrounding Noriega, Milosevic, and Pinochet,
domestic courts across the globe, whether in Chile, Miami, Yugoslavia, or Spain, are
growing more inclined to dismember any shield of immunity and hold former leaders
accountable for their actions under domestic and international law").
3. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 1.
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4
long as the minister maintains his or her official capacity.
The International Criminal Court ("ICC"), in contrast, through
provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
("Rome Statute"),5 refuses to permit an immunity defense no matter what
the reason or who asserts the defense. 6 The United States, responding to
the perceived dangers of a no-immunity court, began in the summer of
2002 to negotiate Article 98 Agreements 7 with nations who are both
parties and non-parties to the Rome Statute. These bi-lateral agreements
deprive the ICC ofg8urisdiction over United States citizens, officials, and
military personnel. Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations alike
challenge
these
bilateral
agreements-effectively
impunity
agreements 9-as violative of the Rome Statute. l0 Nevertheless, PierreRichard Prosper, the United States War Crimes Envoy, continually warns
nations that they risk losing foreign aid if they do not grant United States
citizens, officials, and military personnel immunity from the ICC. II
The preamble to the Rome Statute clearly states the mandate of the
ICC:
"Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole must not go unpunished .... 12

Nation-states express virtually the same purpose 13 when they utilize
extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute persons suspected of committing
14
crimes offensive to international standards of justice.
Recent developments in the concept of immunity, such as the

4.

Id. 53.

5. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 183/9
(1998),
37
I.L.M.
999,
art.
27,
available
at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].
6. Id. at art. 28.
7. See Memoranda from the NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court,
Bilateral Agreements Proposed by U.S. Government (Aug. 23, 2002), available at

http://www.iccnow.org [hereinafter Bilateral Agreements]; see also Memoranda from
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, States Parties Should Ratify the Agreement on
Privileges and Immunities Once it Opens for Signature on September l0th (Apr. 17,
2003), available at http://www.iccnow.org.

8.
9.
10.

Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 98.
See BilateralAgreements, supra note 7.
Id.

11.

Peter Selvin, War Crimes Envoy Gets Face-to-FaceTo Make His Case, WASH.

POST, Oct. 30, 2002, at A21.
12. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at pmbl.
13. See Memorandum from Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty
of States To Enact and Enforce Legislation, ch. 4, Part A (War crimes: State practice at
the national level) (Algeria to Hungary) (Jan. 9, 2001); see also Monica Hans, Comment,
Providing for Uniformity in the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction: Can Either the
Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction or an International Criminal Court
Accomplish this Goal?, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAW 357, 365-68 (2002).
14. Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate & Others, Ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte, 1 A.C. § 3 (2000) [hereinafter Ex parte Pinochet].
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Congo v. Belgium decision, Belgium's amendments to its universal
jurisdiction law, and the United States' Article 98 Agreements, frustrate
the aspiration of holding accountable all persons responsible for certain
international crimes, such as crimes against humanity, torture, war
crimes, and other crimes that violate international norms.
This Comment will evaluate the current viability of an immunity
defense both at customary international law and at the ICC, while also
analyzing the rationale for the divergence between the two concepts. In
making this evaluation, this Comment will apply the current concepts of
and precedents on immunity to current political realities. In addition,
this Comment will show that, both under customary international law
and at the ICC, political and military leaders retain the ability to avoid
prosecution for crimes, even those crimes for which the international
Finally, this
community seeks to hold persons more accountable.
Comment postulates that, both at customary international law and at the
ICC, a uniform approach will develop according to the pragmatic needs
of nation-states and political leaders.
II.

The Development of Head of State Immunity in International
Customary Law

Head of State immunity and extraterritorial jurisdiction, while
certainly different concepts, are not independent of each other. A
defense of Head of State immunity is a claim of immunity from
jurisdiction of a particular state. Roughly 120 states 15 during the latter
half of the twentieth century 16 either enacted or expanded laws granting
them jurisdiction over crimes neither committed by its nationals nor in its
territory. 17
15. An Amnesty International legal memorandum stipulates:
At least 120 states have enacted legislation which would appear to permit their
courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over conduct amounting to some or all
war crimes in certain circumstances. The exact number is difficult to determine
and may well be higher, but the absence of authoritative Commentary or
jurisprudence, as well as ambiguities in wording, in many countries sometimes
makes it difficult to say with certainty whether courts may exercise universal
jurisdiction over conduct amounting to war crimes. Much of the legislation
remains inadequate in terms of the scope of crimes covered, the definitions of
those crimes, the principles of criminal responsibility, defences and other
obstacles to effective prosecution. However, one can say with some degree of
certainty that almost two-thirds of all states permit their courts to exercise
universal jurisdiction over some conduct amounting to war crimes and that in
many cases that legislation has been in existence for a long time.
See Memorandum from Amnesty International, supra note 13.
16. Nuremberg was the first court to operate under a no-immunity principle.
Chimene Keitner, Crafting the InternationalCriminal Court: Trials and Tribulations in
Article 98(2), 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 215, 239 (2001).
17. Hans, supra note 13, at 365-68.
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The numerous states that enacted extraterritorial jurisdiction
established a body of precedent for both the enforcement of
extraterritorial jurisdiction and the applicability of a Head of State
immunity defense. Customary international law is defined as those laws
"found in collective state practice supplemented in some instances by
18
widespread codification at the national or international level."'
Currently, the scope and applicability of a defense of Head of State
immunity in customary international law 19 is either undefined or
disagreed upon, despite that, conceptually, Head of State immunity
is a
21
immunity.
diplomatic
and
immunity
derivative of sovereign
The concept of Head of State immunity evolved from a notion of
absolute immunity, a concept grounded in the principle of state
sovereignty, 22 to one of less encompassing immunity. 23Contemporary
international precedents on the applicability of a Head of State immunity
defense draw distinctions between official acts (immunities ratione
material)
• 24 and private...acts (immunities ratione personae). Ratione
materiae -- or functional immunity-refers to immunities inuring to
state officials with respect to acts they perform in their official capacity;
ratione personae25--or personal immunities-refers to immunities
inuring from acts closely related to an official state function. The
importance of safeguarding states from foreign interference is the
policy
26
foundation of immunities rationepersonae and ratione materiae.
The distinctions between these two concepts of immunity are
significant. Jurisprudence in recent years-but prior to Congo v.
Belgium-reasoned that certain universally deplored acts are never
official acts; 27 thus, regardless of position, nations attempted to hold
accountable any person who committed certain universally-deplored

18. Former United States War Crimes Envoy David J.Scheffer, a proponent of the
ICC, offers this definition in his comment on the future of atrocity law. David J.
Scheffer, The Future of Atrocity Law, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.389, 428 (2002).
19. The statutes and practices of the various international tribunals do not contribute
to the body of customary international law applicable to nation-states; therefore, the
statutorily created no-immunity rules of the ICC, ICTY, and International Criminal

Tribunal for Rwanda are not applicable in customary international law.
Belgium, supra note 1, 58.

Congo v.

20. See Kerry Creque O'Neill, Note, A New Customary Law of Head of State
Immunity?: Hirohito and Pinochet, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 289, 291 (2002).
21. Id.at291.
22. Hans, supra note 13, at 379-8 1.
23. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 1, 72.

24. Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials be Tried for International
Crimes?, 13 EuR. J.INT'L L. 753, 862-64 (2002).
25. Id.at 862-64.
26. Id.at 862.
27. O'Neill, supra note 20, at 294.
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international crimes. 28 However, and of importance to understanding the
precedential value of the ICJ's decision, the Congo v. Belgium holding
neglected to differentiate between official and private acts. Therefore,
cases in customary international law that held either Heads of State or
other governmental ministers accountable for acts not considered to be
official, maintain some precedential value. This is significant because
there is often a very fine line between official and private acts. When
either the legitimacy of the official authority is in question or the action
itself is disputed as not an act of state, it becomes30increasingly difficult to
differentiate between official and unofficial acts.
Before one can ..
analyze whether
or not immunity
..
31 is a viable
• defense,
• 32
the establishment of jurisdiction-either national, extraterritorial, or
in an ad hoc tribunal -is necessary.34 Jurisdiction must be established
first because, by definition, immunity is shorthand for immunity from
jurisdiction.3 5 When a person claims immunity, he or she is not claiming
immunity from the alleged crime committed; rather, he or she is claiming
immunity from the legal process that establishes culpability. 36 National
courts not operating under a universal jurisdiction statute are only able to
prosecute foreign nationals who commit crimes not occurring on the
prosecuting state's territory and which do not involve the prosecuting
state's nationals through an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
There are two forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 37 The first,
absolute universal jurisdiction, is defined as jurisdiction over offenses
committed abroad by foreigners, the exercise of which is not made
subordinate to the territorial presence of the suspect. 38 Moreover,
absolute universal jurisdiction, dating from the international practice of
trying pirates in an apprehending nation's courts, reveals an international
acceptance of the belief that states have an interest in prosecuting
persons 40who violate certain universal values, 39 such as a terroristic
offense.
28. Id.
29. Cassese, supra note 24, at 862-64.
30. See infra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
31. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v.
Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 121, 5 (Feb. 14) (Sep. Op. Judge Koroma) [hereinafter Congo v.
Belgium, Sep. Op. Judge Koroma].
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
36. Congo v. Belgium, Sep. Op. Judge Koroma, supra note 31.
37. See Cassese, supra note 24, at 857-59.
38. Id. at 857.
39. Id. at 859.
40.

Salvatore Zappala, Do Heads of States in Office Enjoy Immunity from
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The other type of extraterritorial jurisdiction is conditional universal
jurisdiction. Under this form of extraterritorial jurisdiction, a person's
prosecuting nation's soil is necessary41 in order for
apprehension on the ....
It was the
that foreign nation to try the accused in a domestic court.
adoption of absolute universal jurisdiction, as opposed to conditional
universal jurisdiction, that enabled the dilution of the immunity defense
during the latter half of the twentieth century. 42 As discussed herein
however, this dilution has at least been halted, but more likely reversed. 4
A.

The Devolution of the Immunity Defense
1.

The Indictment of General Pinochet

The question of what constitutes official acts, as well as the extent
of official status, sha4ed the House of Lord's reasoning in its indictment
of General Pinochet.
Pinochet's lack of immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United Kingdom, pursuant to customary international law as applied
by the House of Lords, resulted from Chile's ratification of an
international treaty.4 5 As reasoned by the House of Lords, ratification of
the International Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman,
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1984 represented a de facto
acceptance of the illegality of torture by the Chilean nation, and
because torture cannot possibly be an official act of a Head of State, 4
General Pinochet was not48 entitled to claim functional immunityimmunity ratione materiae.
The definition of what is and what is not an official act will be

Jurisdictionfor InternationalCrimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de
Cassation, 12 EuR. J. INT'L L. 391, 610-11 (2001)
41. See id. at 857.
42. Cassese, supra note 24, at 862.
43. See infra notes 89-109 and accompanying text.
44. Ex parte Pinochet, supra note 14.
45.

Id.

3.

46. Id. 3, 43.
47. The Human Rights Watch issued a letter to United States President George W.
Bush on December 27, 2002 cautioning him that the CIA's methods of interrogation
could lead to an exercise of universal jurisdiction by a nation state. Letter from Kenneth
Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to President Bush, Secretary of State
Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor
Condoleezza

Rice

(Dec.

27,

2002),

available

at

http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/12/us1227.html.
48. William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The
Pinochet Case and the Move Towards a Universal System of Transnational Law
Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129, 160-61 (2000).
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significant in attempting to hold Saddam Hussein 4 9 accountable for
-crimes committed against his own citizens and other states. 50 The United
Kingdom, in November 2002, released a dossier outlining its intelligence
reports in relation to alleged Iraqi War Crimes, Crimes Against
Humanity, and other internationally deplored acts. 5 1 Following the
Pinochet indictment, and the holding of the Noriega case, discussed
herein, characterization of an act as "official" will be determinative in a
successful application of an immunity defense based on immunity
ratione materiae.
Moreover, Pinochet, for the reason of the manner he assumed
power, was unable to assert an immunity ratione personae defense
because a claim to Head of State immunity is contingent on the
legitimacy of the leader. 52 Pinochet's "illegitimate" power derived from
a military coup that removed Salvador Allende, Chile's democratically
elected President. 53 Had Pinochet established that his acts derived from
authority granted to him by the Chilean people, then his culpability for
acts of torture and murder-pursuant to immunity ratione personaewould have54 been limited to those crimes committed either before or after
his tenure.
2. The United States' Rejection of Noriega's Immunity Claim
The 1990 prosecution of Panama's former leader, General Manuel
Noriega, marked the first time that the United States brought a foreign
Head of State to stand trial in the United States through an exercise of
49. David E. Sanger & James Dao, U.S. Is Completing Plan To Promote a
DemocraticIraq, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2003, at Al.
50. See Ethan S. Burger, The Recognition of Governments UnderInternationalLaw:

The Challenge of the Belarusian PresidentialElection of September 9, 2001 for the
United States, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 107, 156 n.241 (2003) ("Under customary
international law, the head of state doctrine provides for immunity to a head of state, with
respect to the official's official acts. If evidence surfaced that President Lukashenka was
involved in the disappearances of opposition figures, leaders in some OSCE member
states could decide that they have no legal obligation to grant President Lukashenka
immunity either on the grounds that he was not engaged in official acts with respect to
the disappearances of opposition figures or that he was not the legitimate Belarusian head
of state. For an individual such as President Lukashenka, to benefit from head of state
immunity, he must be deemed by the receiving country [e.g. the U.S.] as the 'head of
state."').
51. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, SADDAM
HUSSEIN: CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 3 (Nov. 2002), available at
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page6737.asp ("T[he] grave violations of human
rights are not the work of a number of overzealous individuals but the deliberate policy of
the regime. Fear is Saddam's chosen method for staying in power.").
52. Ex parte Pinochet, supra note 14,
44-45.
53. See Aceves, supra note 48, at 161.
54. See id. at 160-61.
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Noriega's denial of immunity
absolute universal jurisdiction. 55
demonstrated that, because of the illegitimacy of non-constitutional
military rule, leaders of illegitimate military regimes will be held
culpable for crimes committed against their own citizens and other
nations, thus constituting a denial of rationepersonae.
In Noriega's prosecution, the Florida Southern District Court held
that because the leader of armed forces was not the country's legitimate
leader, was not acting on behalf of the state, and was not a diplomat, he
was not entitled to Head of State immunity. 56 The court reasoned that
recognition of an immunity defense would effectively legitimize illegal
dictatorships.5 7 Noriega's power derived from his position as the
commander of the Panama Defense Force, rather than that of
58
Panamanian Head of State as defined by the Panamanian Constitution. 59
Moreover, the Panamanian State never sought immunity for Noriega.
Such an act of support for its deposed leader would have added some
credence to his claim
of legitimacy, thus sustaining an immunity ratione
60
materiaedefense.
Precedents, such as the Noriega case, which require recognition of a
leader's legitimate official capacity, are of significance for some United
States allies. Pakistan's General Pervez Musharraf,6 1 who led the coup
against Pakistan's civilian government on October 12, 1999 and
instituted military rule, could face obstacles in defining his office as

55.
56.
57.

Hasson, supra note 2, at 125.
United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1510 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
The Southern District Court of Florida stated:

The provision of customary international law cited by Defendant as an
acceptable definition of a head of state would not include Noriega. The
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (T.I.A.S. No.
8532; 28 U.S.T. 1975) defines "internationally protected person" as "(a) a Head
of State, including any member of a collegial body performing the functions of
a Head of State under the constitution of the State concerned, a Head of
Government or a Minister of Foreign Affairs .... "
Id. at 1520. The court further reasoned that Noriega had not shown that he was
either the ceremonial or the official head of government, and he does not otherwise
fulfill the definition. Id.
58. See Hasson, supra note 2, at 142.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See Pamela Constable, Great ExpectationsFade in Pakistan;A Year After Coup,
Country's Problems, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2000, at A17; see also Karl Vick, Pakistani
Leader Accused of Trying To Grab Power; RestructuringPlan Is Broadly Condemned,
WASH. POST, June 28, 2002, at A 18 (stating that Musharraf's constitutional amendments

would permanently restructure the government, giving him constitutional power to
dissolve parliament, appoint or dismiss a prime minister, and establish a National
Security Council above any elected government).
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legitimate. 62 As demonstrated in the Pinochet and Noriega cases and left
unaltered by the Congo v. Belgium decision, the official nature of a
leader's authority continues to be relevant as to whether he or she63may
claim Head of State immunity and avoid extraterritorial jurisdiction.
3.

The PrincetonPrincipleson UniversalJurisdiction

The 2001 publication of The Princeton Principles on Universal
Jurisdiction ("Princeton Principles") further established the trend
towards removing obstacles that prevent nations from holding
accountable perpetrators of universally condemned crimes in national
courts through an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 64
The
Princeton Principles-whichwere compiled by noted jurists, academics,
and human rights activists 65 after an examination of various holdings in
both customary international law 66 and tribunal law 67--express the
68
position that "certain crimes are too heinous to go unpunished."
Seeking to end centuries of innocent deaths as a result of genocide,
crimes
humanity,
war crimes, and other serious crimes under
• against
•
69...
international law, the Princeton Principlescreate guidelines for states
to follow when adopting universal jurisdiction.7 0 These guidelines seek
to ensure that perpetrators deserving of prosecution are held
62. Munir Ahmad, Musharraf Amends Constitution, Empowering Pakistan's
Military,WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2002, at A10.
63. See generally supra notes 50, 58, and accompanying text.
64. THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 11, 49 (Stephen
Macedo ed., 2001), available at http://www.princeton.edu/l-apa/univejur.pdf.
[hereinafter PRINCETON PRINCIPLES].
65. Sponsoring Organizations of the Princeton Principles: Program in Law and
Public Affairs and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Princeton
University; International Commission of Jurists; American Association for the
International Commission of Jurists; Netherlands Institute of Human Rights; Urban
Morgan Institute for Human Rights. Id
66. See id.at 39.
67. Id. at 49-50.
68. Mary Robinson, Forewordto PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 17.
69. Id.at 23.
70. The authors specifically outlined the intended utility of The Princeton
Principles:
These Principles on Universal Jurisdiction are intended to be useful to
legislators seeking to ensure that national laws conform to inter-national law, to
judges called upon to interpret and apply international law and to consider
whether national law conforms to their state's international legal obligations, to
government officials of all kinds exercising their powers under both national
and international law, to non-governmental organizations and members of civil
society active in the promotion of international criminal justice and human
rights, and to citizens who wish to better understand what international law is
and what the international legal order might become.
Id. at 26
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accountable.71
The policy behind the Princeton Principles is clear: "To stop this
cycle of violence and to promote justice, impunity for the commission of
serious crimes must yield to accountability." 72 The guidelines for the
application of universal jurisdiction are solely aimed at ensuring
in spite of a person's political, military, or governmental
accountability,
73
position.

Mary Robinson, the former United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, comments in her foreword to the PrincetonPrinciples
on how recent national decisions, including the Pinochet indictment,
74
mitigate a Head of State's ability to employ an immunity defense.
Recognizing only procedural immunity for sitting Heads of State,7 5 the
Princeton Principles allow for prosecution through an application of
universal jurisdiction after the end of an official's official capacity,
thereby preventing an official76 from being permanently immune from
prosecution for a criminal act.
The movement towards greater accountability reflected a growing
consensus among nations and scholars interpreting customary law that

71. Id.
72. Id.at 23.
73. Hans, supra note 13, at 393-95 (arguing that so long as a state's laws provide for
universal jurisdiction over crimes determined to be of universal concern by customary
international law or by treaty, the state may prosecute those individuals responsible for
committing such crimes).
74. Robinson, supra note 68, at 17.
75. In the Comment, the authors of the Princeton Principlesstate:
in proceedings before national tribunals, procedural immunity remains in effect
during a head of state's or other official's tenure in office, or during the period
in which a diplomat is accredited to a host state. Under international law as it
exists, sitting heads of state, accredited diplomats, and other officials cannot be
prosecuted while in office for acts committed in their official capacities.
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 49.

76. Principles Five, Six, and Seven of The Princeton Principles-the immunities
principles--clearly state its no-immunity position:
Principle 5-Immunities
With respect to serious crimes under international law ... the official position
of any accused person, whether as head of state or government or as a
responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal
responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
Principle 6-Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations or other forms of prescription shall not apply to serious
crimes under inter-national law ....

Principle 7-Amnesties
1. Amnesties are generally inconsistent with the obligation of states to provide
accountability for serious crimes under international law...
2. The exercise of universal jurisdiction with respect to serious crimes under
international law . . . shall not be precluded by amnesties which are

incompatible with the inter-national legal obligations of the granting state.
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certain crimes, so abhorrent in their nature, assault values that every
nation shares and wishes to protect. 77 Moreover, apart from merely
holding shared values, nations came to exhibit a desire to punish the
perpetrators who assault those common values. 78 This desire came to
imbue the policy of several nations' universal jurisdiction statutes. 79 As
the trend away from permitting a Head of State immunity defense gained
strength, it became apparent that "as the attribution of responsibility and
accountability [became] firmer, the possibility for the assertion of
jurisdiction wider and the availability of immunity as a shield more
limited."
Centuries of interstate relations based on the notion of the
sovereignty of nations became increasingly subjugated by the desire to
hold accountable all persons, regardless of rank or stature, for universally
deplored crimes.
B.

The Beginning of a Retreatfrom the Devolution Trend?
1. The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation and
Spain's Inability to Exercise Jurisdiction over Fidel Castro

After charges were filed implicating Libya's Mouammar Ghaddafi
with involvement in the bombing of a UTA French Airline jet on
September 19, 1989, the French Supreme Court declined jurisdiction by
asserting the principle of Head of State immunity. 8 1 The French
Supreme Court held that contemporary international customary law
prohibits the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute sitting
82
Heads of State.
While it may seem that the Cour de Cassation felt legally
constrained, Salvatore Zappala argues that political pressures persuaded
the court to decline jurisdiction. 83 Zappala states that Ghaddafi was not
entitled to functional immunity-pursuant to the Pinochet
Indictment84
because his crime, terrorism, was an international crime.
Assertions that political pressure adversely interferes with the
prosecution of a Head of State accused of committing international
crimes are not confined to the French judicial system.8 5 Belgium, after
Id.at 31.
77. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 1, 72.
78. Id.
79. Id. 73.
80. Id. 75.
81. Zappala, supra note 40, at 595-96.
82. Id.at 597.
83. Id.at 611-12.
84. Id.
85. Tom L.W. Scheirs, Accusations Against IsraeliPrime Minister Urge Belgium To
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facing years of continued pressure to indict Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon,86 acted in July 2003 to amend its universal jurisdiction statute,
the War Crimes Act, to ensure stability in its international and bilateral
relations with other states. 87 Many pundits claim that Belgium's sole
impetus for amending its universal jurisdiction statute was not to bring
its law into line with a greater regard for the importance and value of
Head of State immunity, but to afford protection against the fallout of a
politicall , embarrassing investigation and claims against third-party
nations.
Further evidence supporting the contention that Heads of State do
enjoy some degree of immunity can be gleaned from the Cour de
Cassation'sMarch 13, 2001 Qaddafi decision. Belgium, in its CounterMemorial in the Congo v. Belgium case, contended that the Cour de
Cassation implicitly recognized the existence of an exception to Head of
State immunity. 89 By holding that "under international law as it
currently stands, the crimes alleged [acts of terrorism], irrespective of its
gravity, does not come within the exceptions to the principle of immunity
from jurisdiction for incumbent foreign Heads of State," the court
implicitly recognized the existence of viable Head of State immunity
defenses.
The fact that the court held that acts of terrorism do not fall
within one of the exceptions
for Head of State immunity indicated that
91
there are exceptions.
Similar to the Qaddafi decision, Spain, in 1999, also opted to
decline to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
over Fidel Castro, citing
92
his status as a sitting Head of State.
It may be appropriate to view both the Noriega and Castro
decisions as precursors to the holding of Congo v. Belgium, although, as
Rethink War Crimes Act, 17 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 427 (2001) (noting suggestions,

resulting from Belgium's desire to avoid diplomatic difficulties during its presidency of
the European Union, that Belgium amend its War Crimes Act so as to filter all
indictments against foreign leaders through the House of Representatives of the Belgium
Parliament).
86. Complainants accuse Ariel Sharon of crimes against humanity and war crimes
against civilians for his involvement in the 1982 slaughter of 800 civilians in the
Lebanese refugee camps of Sabre and Chatilla. Id.
87. Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, Belgium Law Concerning ASIL Insights:
The Punishment of Grace Breaches of International HumanitarianLaw: A Contested
Law with Untested Objectives, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insighl 12.html

(last visited Dec. 26, 2003).
88. Id.
89. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 1, 20.
90. Id.
91. Id. 56.
92. See Cassese, supra note 24, at 864 n. 17 (the Spanish order held that the Spanish
Supreme Court could not exercise its criminal jurisdiction because of Castro's status as
an incumbent Head of State).
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Salvatore Zappala argues, politics may simply have trumped a legal right
to prosecute. Both the French and Spanish courts followed a pragmatic
rationale in declining to exercise jurisdiction. This stance may illustrate
the view that the idealism of nations in their attempts to enforce what
they perceive to be universally accepted norms may necessarily be
subjugated to the political ramifications of any such enforcement.
C. A Retreatfrom the Develoution Trend
1.

The International
Decision

Court of Justice's Congo v. Belgium

The ICJ, in Congo v. Belgium, reversed the trend in customary
international law of restricting the application of a Head of State
immunity defense, a precedent that clarified some recent national
94
The Court held that the Congolese foreign minister
contradictions.
for both
enjoys immunity from foreign jurisdiction and inviolability
95
office.
his
maintains
he
while
acts
official
and
private
The Congo v. Belgium decision departed from the holdings of
national courts, which previously declined immunity defenses for
Generals Pinochet 96 and Noriega 97 and Mouammar Ghaddafi. 98 Prior to
February 2002, states increasingly resorted to an assertion of absolute
universal jurisdiction-jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the
99
crime-to safeguard what nations perceived to be universal values.
Now, national courts are more commonly subjugating their interest in
holding persons accountable for crimes that offend international norms to
their interest in maintaining stable interstate relations and the notion of
national sovereignty.
According to the reasoning of the court, Belgium's issuance of an
arrest warrant for Abdulaye Yerodia, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the
Democratic Republic of Congo, violated the principle of sovereign
equality 100 and unduly interfered with official state functions 10 1-ratione
93. See supra notes 14, 53, 87, and accompanying text.
94. The court further states that the holding is not merely applicable to Foreign
Ministers, but also to "certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head
" Congo v. Belgium,
of State, Head of Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs ....
supra note 1,1 51.
95. Id. 55
96. Ex parte Pinochet, supra note 14.
97. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1510 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
98.

Zappala, supra note 40.

99. Cassese, supra note 24, at 862.
100. See Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 EuR. J.INT'L L. 509, 600
(1998) (the notion of sovereign equality is central to the "normative foundation of
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materiae. The ICJ's holding, however, continues to limit an immunity
defense in some important ways. First, domestic courts are not limited in
their ability to prosecute their own governmental ministers. Second,
officials will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the
1 2
state they represent (or have represented) waives that immunity. 0
Third, after a person ceases to hold office, he or she will no longer enjoy
all of the immunities accorded by international law in other states for acts
committed either before or after the term in office. Finally, an
international tribunal, 0 such
as the ICC, may still try an official if it can
3
jurisdiction.
establish
These limitations leave open the possibility of an exercise of
absolute universal jurisdiction after the expiration of a Head of State or
governmental minister's term of official capacity. More importantly for
current developments in international law, the Congo v. Belgium decision
affirmatively speaks to the ICC's no-immunity policy.
The ICJ's reasoning, an example of immunity ratione materiae,
follows that "no distinction can be drawn between acts performed by a
Minister for Foreign Affairs in an official capacity, or ... between acts
performed before the person concerned assumed office . . . and acts

committed during the period of office."' 1 5 Following this line of
reasoning, the "immunity and inviolability protect the individual
concerned against any act of authority of another state which would
hinder him or her in the performance of his or her duties." 106 Hence, in
accordance with the customary law principle of the sovereignty of
nations, 107 the Congo v. Belgium decision is crafted not for the personal
benefit of a governmental minister or Head of State, but rather for the
08
protection of the state itself and the people who live therein. 1
The modem political realities under which nation-states operate no
longer allow for a strict differentiation of the powers and responsibilities
of governmental ministers. 109 The offices of foreign minister, and many
other prominent ministerial positions, currently represent a state in the
same way as a Head of State.
Thus, to a greater extent than previously
international law").
101.

Congo v. Belgium, supra note 1, 9 62.

102.

Id. 61.

103. Id.
104. Id.T55.
105. Id. 54.
106. But see Jack Goldsmith, Book Review, Sovereignty, International Relations
Theory, and InternationalLaw, 52 STAN. L. REv. 959 (2000).
107. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 1, 52-54.
108. Congo v. Belgium, Sep. Op. Judge Koroma, supra note 31, 6.

109.

Id.

110.

The Institut de Droit Internationaladvocated for an expansion of the traditional
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recognized, the rationale for immunizing a Head of State can be extended
to other ministers. I I This line of reasoning underlies a policy of
"provid[ing] for stability of international relations and effective
international intercourse . . . . 112 It was this desire to promote stability
that drove the ICJ to limit states in their application of universal
jurisdiction." 3 In effect, the court perceived the danger to interstate
benefit gained from the exercise of
relations to be greater than the
14
absolute universal jurisdiction.
D. Amending UniversalJurisdictionLaw
In 1993, Belgium enacted a universal jurisdiction law,115 which was
amended in 1999, that granted Belgium courts jurisdiction to prosecute
persons for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity based on
universal jurisdiction in ansentia.116 Belgium's universal jurisdiction
law rejected all defenses of immunity.
After years of pressure from such nations as Israel and the United
States, Belgium amended its war crimes law in July 2003. 117 The
amendments draw a distinction between claims brought based on
universal jurisdiction and claims brought against Belgium nationals or
those arrested on Belgium territory.1 1 8 Under the new amendments, only
a Belgian federal prosecutor can bring a charge against a non-Belgian or
a person who committed a crime outside of Belgium territory.
notion of head of state immunity in the preamble to their 2001 resolution on the
Immunity of Heads of State:
Wishing to dispel uncertainties encountered in contemporary practice pertaining
to the inviolability and immunity from jurisdiction and enforcement that a Head
of State or Head of Government can invoke before the authorities of another
State;
Affirming that special treatment is to be given to a Head of State or a Head of
Government, as a representative of that State and not in his or her personal
interest, because this is necessary for the exercise of his or her functions and
the fulfillment of his or her responsibilities in an independent and effective
manner, in the well-conceived interest of both the State or the Government of
which he or she is the Head and the international community as a whole.
Justitia Et Pace, Institut De Droit International, Immunities from Jurisdiction and
Execution of Heads of State and of Government in International Law (Thirteenth
Commission, Rapporteur: Mr. Joe Verhoeven) (Session of Vancouver, 2001), available
at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/navig-res-chonI .html.
111. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 1, 5 (asserting, however, that the promotion of
good inter-state relations will only be maintained if there are some special circumstances
that do require the exercise of an international criminal jurisdiction).
112. 1d. 53.
113. Id. 5.
114. Belgium terms its universal jurisdiction law as "universal competence."
115. Id.
116. Smis & Van der Borght, supra note 87.
117. Id.
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Moreover, the 2003 amendments provide that a federal prosecutor will
initiate a criminal action, unless one of four exceptions apply:
1. the claim is clearly without merit;
2. the facts described in the claim cannot be interpreted as
constituting a crime as defined in the law;
3. the claim cannot give rise to an admissible criminal investigation;
or,
4. where the needs of justice or the international obligations of
Belgium require that the claim should be brought before an
international court or tribunal, before the national courts of the place
of commission of the suspected crimes, the national courts of the
state from
which the suspect is a national or where the suspect can be
119
found.
The 2003 amendments are not only responsive to the ICJ's Congo v.
Belgium decision, but they also reflect the growing recognition of the
importance of basing universal jurisdiction laws on the principal of
complementarity-with the primary purpose of preserving the notions of
equality of nations and national sovereignty. In addition, the 2003
amendments, by only empowering a federal prosecutor to initiate
complaints and investigations against those brought into the Belgium
court system through an application of universal jurisdiction, provide
procedural protections against politically motivated prosecutions.
After years of pressure from foreign governments whose
nationals 12 1 were charged pursuant to Belgium's universal jurisdiction
law, the Belgium government was forced to recognize the damaging
effects the law was having on the reputation of Belgium and the stability
of its international relations. 12 2 The 2003 amendments reflect the
growing consensus amongst nations that laws on jurisdiction must
protect the stability of interstate relations and prevent an individual or
118. Id.
119. The Belgium court of appeal, following the August 2003 approval of the
amendments to the universal competence law, dismissed claims against United States
General Tommy Franks. Philippe Siuberski, Belgium Court Throws out Lawsuit Against
US General over Iraq, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 23, 2003.

120. Id.
121. Some of the more prominent foreign nationals charged pursuant to Belgium
universal jurisdiction law include: Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, President George
H. W. Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Chinese president Jiang Zemin. Id.
122. The United States warned that the application of Belgium's universal jurisdiction
law threatened its ability to remain the host of such international organizations as the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Id.
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nation from abusing the universal jurisdiction law for the furtherance of
political objectives.
III.

The International Criminal Court's Complete Rejection of Any and
All Immunity Defense

As stipulated by the Rome Statute, the ICC officially came into
existence on July 1, 2002 with the sixtieth state's ratification of the
Rome Treaty. 123 But, even before the creation of the ICC, the United
States officially declared its decision not to ratify the Rome Treaty on
May 6, 2002.124 Citing the vulnerability of United States armed
forces 125 and state officials 126 to arbitrary or politically motivated ICC
prosecutions, the United States rejected127any claim of jurisdiction by
either the ICC or state parties to the ICC.
The United States is not
alone
• ,.
• .. in
128 its reluctance to submit itself and
Both the ICC, in its Agreement
its citizens to the ICC's jurisdiction.
129
and the United Nations, in its
of Privileges and Immunities,
its
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN, 130 immunize
.- ,,131
officials from jurisdiction in order to prevent "arbitrary prosecutions.
123. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 126.
124. Press Release, Donald Rumsfeld (No. 233-02) (May 6, 2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/bO5062002_bt233-02.html.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Israel notified the UN that it intended not to ratify the Rome treaty:
On 28 August 2002, the Secretary-General received from the Government of
Israel, the following communication: "... in connection with the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court adopted on 17 July 1998, . . . Israel does not
intend to become a party to the treaty. Accordingly, Israel has no legal
obligations arising from its signature on 31 December 2000. Israel requests that
its intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be reflected in the
depositary's status lists relating to this treaty."
Treaties,
at
Nations
United
See
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXVII/treaty I 0.a
sp#N3 (last visited Feb. 2, 2004).
129. Article 15 states:
The judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors and the Registrar shall,
when engaged on or with respect to the business of the Court, enjoy the same
privileges and immunities as are accorded to heads of diplomatic missions and
shall, after the expiry of their terms of office, continue to be accorded immunity
from legal process of every kind in respect of words which had been spoken or
written and acts which had been performed by them in their official capacity
Draft Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court,
U.N. Doc. CNICC/2001/WGAPIC/L. 1,art. 15 (Oct. 3, 2001).
130. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13,
1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Privileges and Immunities Convention].
131. Background Paper for the Consultation with the Representatives of the
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Article 25 of the ICC's Agreement on Privileges and Immunities avers
that "[p]rivileges and immunities ... are accorded to the representatives
of States and intergovernmental organizations not for the personal
benefit of the individuals themselves, but in order to safeguard the
independent exercise of their functions in connection with the work of
the Assembly .... 132 The United Nations expresses virtually the same
133
purpose-immunity ratione materiae-for immunizing its officials.
Evidently, the ICC, nations supporting the creation of the ICC,134 and the
United Nations, do not view the threat of arbitrary prosecutions against
United States citizens 135 with the same degree of concern that compels
those institutions to immunize their own personnel.
The Bush administration posits that United States citizens, officials,
and military personnel-although the United States is not a party to the
ICC-remain vulnerable to ICC prosecution.136 Moreover, in addition to
being vulnerable for crimes actually committed, the administration
maintains that United States
. 137 citizens remain acutely subject to politically

motivated prosecutions
initiated by ICC officials, who are
undemocratically appointed and subject to persuasion by third party
interests.138 It should be noted, however, that the ICC can only initiate
an investigation of a crime perpetrated after the Rome Statute entered

International Criminal Tribunals of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda on Privileges and
Immunities of the International Criminal Court (July 3, 2001), available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/prepcom/papersonprepcomissues.html
[hereinafter
Background Paper].
132. Draft Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal
Court, supra note 129, at art. 25.
133. Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 130, at art. 5(20) ("Privileges
and immunities are granted to officials in the interests of the United Nations and not for
the personal benefit of the individuals themselves.").
134. Background Paper, supra note 131.
135. Alfred P. Rubin, The International Criminal Court: Possibilities for
ProsecutorialAbuse, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153 (2001). But cf Judge Richard
Goldstone, Former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and Chair of South Africa's
Constitutional Court, Address to the Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State
University (July 23, 2002) (on file with author) (stating that the weight of European
Democracies in the ICC and their appointments to the prosecutor's office of the ICC will
safeguard against any politically motivated prosecutions).
136. Rumsfeld, supra note 124.
137. John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court
from America's Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 173 (2001) (stating that

the United States' main concern should be a politically unaccountable ICC prosecutor
initiating an investigation or issuing an indictment against top civilian and military
leaders who are responsible for defense and foreign policy).
138. Rubin, supra note 135, at 157-63 (criticizing the ICC codifications for being too
general and vague; in addition to granting ICC prosecutor too much authority with
suspect checks); see also Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States and
The InternationalCriminalCourt, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 388-90 (2002).
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into force.
In order to protect its myriad interests, the United States initiated
negotiations for Article 98 Agreements14 with both Rome Treaty
signatories and non-treaty nations.14 1 In response, advocates of the ICC,
including Non-Governmental Organizations 14 2 and most European
governments, attacked the agreements 143 on both legal and policy
139. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 24.
140. Article 98 of the Rome Treaty, entitled "Cooperation with Respect To Waiver of
Immunity and Consent To Surrender," reads:
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations
under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a
person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to
surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain
the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.
Id. at art. 98.
141. BilateralAgreements, supra note 7
142. Id.
143. Reflecting the major criticism of Article 98 Agreements and in an effort to
persuade other nations not to sign Article 98 agreements with the United States, the
Human Rights Watch sent a letter to the European Foreign Ministers outlining their
major legal objections:
(1) Article 98 must be construed narrowly and consistently with the
jurisdictional regime in the Rome Statute, which is based on the nationality of
the accused or the state where the crimes occurred.
(2) Article 98 does not override the requirement that national prosecutions for
Rome Statute crimes be subject to ICC scrutiny to determine whether
investigations and prosecutions are conducted in good faith.
(3) States Parties and signatories of the Rome Statute are legally required to
ensure that these basic and important aspects of the Rome Statute are not
violated: States Parties by virtue of their legal obligations in the Rome Statute
to cooperate with the ICC; signatories of the Rome Statute by virtue of their
legal obligations under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to
"refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of the Rome
Statute.
(4) Article 98 permits a State Party to enter into jurisdictional-routing
agreements with another State Party that allows it first chance at investigating
and prosecuting. Such agreements are technically consistent with the
complementarity principle in the Rome Statute, although Human Rights Watch
discourages States Parties from entering into them with other State Parties.
(5) Article 98 does not permit a non-State Party (and particularly one that has
repudiated the Rome Statute) to effectively provide immunity from the ICC's
jurisdiction and to obstruct the efforts of the ICC either to prosecute the most
serious international crimes or to ensure that good faith national prosecutions
occur.

(6) States Parties and signatories of the Rome Statute should not sign an
agreement providing immunity from ICC prosecution with a country that has
repudiated or has not signed the Rome Statute-to do so would undermine the

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:3

grounds. 144 In a fashion typical of other European governments, the
German government responded to the European Union's decision to
reject the United States' invitation to engage in Article 98 Agreements
with:
A strong and comprehensive reaffirmation of the EU commitment to
the ICC, to the integrity of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court and to the obligations of States Parties under the
Statute, including the obligation of State Parties under Part 9 of the
Rome 14Statute
to cooperate fully with the International Criminal
5
Court.

In addition to the strong words of the German government, every
other member of the European Union signed and ratified the Rome
Treaty and a common policy in support of the ICC. 146 The Council of
Europe, likewise, criticized the United States for undermining the Rome
Treaty by refusing to sign the Rome Treaty and encouraging other states
to sign Article 98 agreements. 4 7 While the nations of the European
"object and purpose" of the treaty.
(7) Agreements ("Article 98" agreements or Status-of-Forces Agreements) that
purport to require States Parties and signatories of the Rome Statute to turn
over military personnel suspected of committing crimes within the ICC's
jurisdiction to a country that has repudiated or has not signed the Rome Statute
are thus not valid.
Letter from Lotte Leicht, Brussels Office Director Human Rights Watch, to European
Foreign Ministers on Article 98 Agreements (Aug. 23, 2002), available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/eu-ItrO823.htm.
144. Id. ("Article 98 was included in the Rome Statute to provide an orderly and
rational process for the handling of suspects among states cooperating with the Court. It
was not intended to allow a state that has refused to cooperate with the Court to negotiate
a web of agreements to secure exemption for its citizens or otherwise undermine the
effective functioning of the Court.").
145. Interpretation Prepared by the German Government of the EU Conclusions
Related
to
the
EU-US
Non-Surrender
Agreements,
at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissuesimpunityagreem.html.
146. For the ratification status of European nations and all other parties to the Rome
Statute, see the United Nations sponsored web site on the ICC, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/.
147. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in September 2002 called
on all member and observer States of the Council of Europe:
a. to establish a joint and solidary position with a view to ensuring the efficient
functioning of the ICC;
b. to refrain from any action which might compromise the integrity of the ICC
Treaty and efficient work of the Court;
c. not to enter into any bilateral "exemption agreements" which would
compromise or limit in any manner their cooperation with the Court in the
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court;
d. to provide all necessary cooperation and assistance with a view to ensuring
the earliest possible effective functioning of the Court;
e. not to avail themselves of the provision in the ICC Treaty which makes it
possible to escape the Court's jurisdiction on war crimes for seven years.
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Union chastise the United States for its attempt to protect its citizens
from the ICC, France, a leading member of the EU and a leading
advocate of the ICC, has already moved to protect its own citizens from a
potentially politically motivated prosecution. 148 France, when it ratified
the Rome Treaty and invoked Article 124,149 obtained a seven year
exemption from ICC jurisdiction for its nationals. 150 France, while
simultaneously criticizing the United States for attempting to protect its
own citizens, moved to invoke Article 124 in order to protect its citizens
from accusations of war crimes. 151
A.

The PoliciesBehind a No-Immunity Court

The preamble to the Rome Statute clearly sets out the policy behind
a no-immunity court: "[T]he most serious crimes of concern to the
152
international community as a whole must not go unpunished ....
Article 27 of the Rome Statute states that "official capacity as a Head of
State or Government, a member of government or parliament, an elected
representative or government official shall in no case exempt a person
from criminal responsibility under this statute, nor1 53shall it, in and of
itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence."
The Rome Statute's no-immunity clause is not unique in the history
of tribunal law. 154 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), considered the model for the ICC, 155 operates

EUR. PARL. Ass. DEB. 29th Sess. 1300 (Sept. 25, 2002),
available at http://www.iccnow.org/html/coe20020925english.pdf (last visted Feb. 2,
2004).
148. John Bolton, Under Secretary Calls It "Clearly Inconsistent with American

Standards," Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute (Nov. 4, 2003).
149.

Article 124 of the Rome Treaty states:

...a State, on becoming a party to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of
seven years after the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it
does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of
crimes referred to in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been committed
by its nationals or on its territory ....
Rome Statute, supra note. 5, at art. 124.
150. Bolton, supra note 148.

151.

Id.; see also Coalition

for the International

Criminal Court, Country

Reprot/France, available at http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/europecis/france.html.

152.
153.

Rome Statute, supra note 5, at pmbl..
Id. at art. 27.

154.

Amann & Sellers, supra note 138, at 393 (stating that Article 27 derives from

court rules of Nuremburg, Tokyo, the Genocide Convention, and the Statutes of the ad
hoc tribunals).
155. Question and Answer Session for Students of the Pennsylvania State University
Dickinson School of Law, Capitals of Europe Program with Claude Jorda, President of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (June 24, 2002) (notes on

file with author).

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:3

under a similar no-immunity statutory clause 156 as Article 27157 of the
Icc.
Some consider Article 27 as a logical step in the evolution of the
international concept of official accountability. 158 However, John
Bolton, the current Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organizations, views the real objective of the ICC and its supporters to
be "t[h]e assert[ion] [of] the supremacy of its authority over nation states,
and to promote prosecution over alternative methods for dealing with the
whether occurring in war or through arbitrary
worst criminal offenses,
1 59
power."'
domestic
The need for tribunals most often derives from either an
unwillingness or an inability of nation-states to prosecute perpetrators of
internationally condemned crimes. 16 The principle that the ICC should
not have jurisdiction over a person who could be prosecuted in the courts
of his or her nation or in the nation where his or her crime occurred-the
principal of complementarity-is codified in Section 17lal of the Rome

156. Amended Statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (as
amended May 17, 2002 by Resolution 1411), art. 7(2)m, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm ("The official position of any accused person,
whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment."); see also
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., at art. 6(2), 1 U.N. Doc. S/RES 955 (1994), available at
http://www.ictr.org ("The official position of any accused person, whether as head of
State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such
person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.").
157. Article 27 of the Rome State, entitled "Irrelevance of Official Capacity," reads:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based
on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute
a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar
the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 27.
158. Bolton, supra note 137, at 169.
159. Id.
160.

PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 64, at 24

161. Article 17 states that the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry
out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and
the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to
prosecute ....
Rome Statute, supra note. 5, at art. 17 (emphasis added).
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Statute. Mouammar Ghaddafi provides an example of a suspected
criminal who could be prosecuted by the ICC in accordance with the
principal of complementarity.162 Salvatore Zappala, as discussed earlier,
postulates that it was nation-state reluctance to prosecute that drove the
French courts to decline to prosecute Manuel Noriega. 163 Therefore,
because the French were "unwilling" to prosecute Manual Noriega, the
principal of complementarity would permit the ICC jurisdiction over the
matter.
Many supporters of the ICC argue that Section 17164 of the Rome
Treaty, which establishes the principle of complimentary, 165 protects
nations and their nationals from politically motivated prosecutions. It
should be noted, however, that there is no guidance on the question of
what amounts to an "unwillingness" or "inability" to prosecute. Could
the refusal of the United States to investigate or prosecute a President, a
Secretary of State, a Provisional Civilian Administrator, or a member of
the United States military constitute an "unwillingness" or "inability" to
prosecute? It is this type of statutory ambiguity that drives the United
States' opposition to the ICC and its continuing efforts to shield itself
from ICC jurisdiction.

162. The principle of complementarity, in essence, denies the ICC jurisdiction over
matters that the courts in the accused nation are able and capable of handling.
163.
164.
165.

Zappala, supra note 40.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, at art. 17.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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66
The United States BilateralAgreements

Protection from politically motivated prosecutions is the central
167
reason behind the United States' drive to sign Article 98 agreements.

166. Proposed Text of the Article 98 Agreements with the United States:
A. Reaffirming the importance of bringing to justice those who commit
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes,
B. Recalling that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court done at
Rome on July 17, 1998 by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court is
intended to complement and not supplant national criminal jurisdiction,
C. Considering that the Government of the United States of America has
expressed its intention to investigate and to prosecute where appropriate acts
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court alleged to have been
committed by its officials, employees, military personnel, or other nationals,
D. Bearing in mind Article 98 of the Rome Statute,
E. Hereby agree as follows:
1. For purposes of this agreement, "persons" are current or former Government
officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals
of one Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the
expressed consent of the first Party,(a)be surrendered or transferred by any
means to the International Criminal Court for any purpose, or(b)be surrendered
or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a
third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to the International
Criminal Court.
3. When the United States extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a
person of the other Party to a third country, the United States will not agree to
the surrender or transfer of that person to the International Criminal Court by
the third country, absent the expressed consent of the Government of X.
4. When the Government of X extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a
person of the United States of America to a third country, the Government of X
will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person to the International
Criminal Court by a third country, absent the expressed consent of the
Government of the United States.
5. This Agreement shall enter into force upon an exchange of notes confirming
that each Party has completed the necessary domestic legal requirements to
bring the Agreement into force. It will remain in force until one year after the
date on which one Party notifies the other of its intent to terminate this
Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with
respect to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effective date
of termination.
Proposed Text of the Article 98 Agreements with the United States, at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissuesimpunityagreem.html.
167. Marc Grossman, United States Department of State's Under Secretary for
Political Affairs, expressed the United States' reservations concerning the ICC. See Marc
Grossman, Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (May 6, 2002),
at http://www.state.gov/p/9949.htm. He asserted that the United States believes that the
ICC undermines the role of the United Nations Security Council in maintaining
international peace and security; that the Rome Statute creates a prosecutorial system that
is an unchecked power; in order to be bound by a treaty, a state must be party to that
treaty-the ICC asserts jurisdiction over citizens of states that have not ratified the treaty,
thus threatening U.S. sovereignty; and that the ICC is built on a flawed foundation-it is
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Without such protection, it is the position of the United States that
"responsible officials may be deterred from carrying out a wide range of
legitimate functions across the spectrum, from actions integral to [United
States] national defense to peacekeeping missions or interventions in
humanitarian crises or civil wars ....168
It was in response to these concerns that the United States sought to
engage nations in Article 98 agreements. 169 The decision to begin
negotiating with states for an exemption from ICC jurisdiction originated
during the open debate in the United Nations Security Council on
Resolution 1422.170 Of note, John Bolton asserts that the same European
Nations, nations that subsequently agreed to a unified stance 17 1 against
signing Article 98 agreements with the United States, encouraged the
United States to resolve concerns about the ICC's jurisdiction through
bilateral agreements. 172 Nonetheless, while the United States seeks to
remove its military and civilian personnel 173 from the jurisdiction of the
ICC, it still officially promotes the notion of bringing those culpable of
committing heinous international crimes to justice, 174175
but in a manner
that protects what it believes to be its national interests.
Member states of the Rome Treaty who enter into Article 98
Agreements with the United States face a potential conflict 176 between
its bilateral obligations with the United States and its obligations
pursuant to the Rome Treaty. 177 According to this view, any agreement
open for exploitation and politically motivated prosecutions. Id.
168. Bolton, supra note 148.
169. Id.
170. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 4572d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002) (providing
that for one year from July 1, 2002, the ICC will not begin, or proceed with, an
investigation or prosecution against officials or personnel of UN peacekeeping operations
contributing to such operations by states not party to the Rome Statute).
171. Council of the European Union, Council Common Position of 13 June 2003 on
the International Criminal Court, art. 1(1) (on file with author) (stating that "[t]he
objective of this Common Position is to support the effective functioning of the Court and
to advance universal support for it by promoting the widest possible participation in the
Rome Statute").
172. Bolton, supra note 148.
173. For example, Article 98 agreements are drafted to protect: members of the
media, delegations of public and private individuals traveling to international meetings,
private individuals accompanying official personnel, contractors working alongside
official personnel, and participants in exchange programs. Id.
174. Sanger & Dao, supra note 49, at Al.
175. See Grossman, supra note 167 (stating that the United States believes in justice
and the promotion of the rule of law; that those who commit the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community should be punished; that states, not international
institutions, are primarily responsible for ensuring justice in the international system; and
that the best way to combat these serious offenses is to build domestic judicial systems,
strengthen political will, and promote human freedom).
176. See Letter from Lotte Lecht, supra note 143.
177. Id.
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between a party and non-party to the Rome Treaty that deprives the ICC
of jurisdiction potentially frustrates the purpose of the Rome Treaty, thus
making invalid the agreement. 17 8 Moreover, critics suggest that the
significance of the United States' Article 98 agreements is that it may
lead to a devolved ICC with limited powers both to indict and try
violating the international norms that the ICC was
individuals accused of 79
1
protect.
to
established
Critics of the United States' drive to sign Article 98 agreements
often cite an apparent conflict between the United States' stance towards
immunity from the ICTY and its current stance towards the ICC. While
the ICC may be considered modeled after the ICTY, 18 the United
States' policy towards a statutory denial of immunity does not follow
from its relationship with the ICTY. 18 1 The Clinton administration
perceived no danger in subjecting United States personnel to the
jurisdiction of the ICTY. The wisdom of this policy, however, was
tested by what some considered to be a politically motivated
investigation by the ICTY prosecutor into NATO actions during its 1999
182
bombing campaign in Yugoslavia.
A possible explanation for the Clinton administration's willingness
to support the ICTY and the United States Senate's refusal to ratify the
Rome Treaty may be found in the mandates of the two tribunals. The
ICTY is uniquely crafted to "prosecute persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia since 1991. " 183 The ICC, in comparison, seeks to
178. See id.; see also EUR. PARL. Ass. DEB. 29th Sess. 1300 (Sept. 25, 2002) (stating
that "the Assembly is greatly concerned by the efforts of some States to undermine the
integrity of the ICC Treaty and especially to conclude bilateral agreements aiming at
exempting their officials, military personnel and nationals from the jurisdiction of the
The Assembly considers that these 'exemption
Court ('exemption agreements').
agreements' are not admissible under the international law governing treaties, in
particular the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which States must
refrain from any action which would not be consistent with the object and the purpose of
a treaty").
179. Keitner, supranote 16, at 221.
180. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
181. The Agreement on Surrender of Persons between the Government of the United
States and the Tribunal, Article 1, reads:
The United States agrees to surrender to the Tribunal, pursuant to the
provisions of this Agreement and the Statute, persons, including United States
citizens, found in its territory whom the Tribunal has charged with or found
guilty of a violation or violations within the competence of the Tribunal as
defined in the Statute.
Agreement on Surrender of Persons between the Government of the United States and the
Tribunal, Article 1, availableat http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm.
182.

Andreas Laursen, NA TO, The War over Kosovo, and the ICTY Investigation, 17

Am. U. INT'L L. REv. 756 (2002).
183. Amended Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra
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"establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court in
relationship with the United Nations system, with jurisdiction over the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole."' 184 While the ICTY's mandate is uniquely tailored to address the
crimes committed by Slobodan Milosevic's regime,
S185 the Rome Statute, on
the other hand, grants the ICC prosecutors
wide discretion to
prosecute persons suspected
of violating the "delicate mosaic" of the
86
international community. 1
The Bush administration, through Article 98 agreements, is seeking
to prevent the United States from being placed in the politically and
87
legally compromising situations that almost materialized at the ICTY.1
C. American Servicemembers' ProtectionAct of2002
The United States Congress affirmed the stance of the Bush
administration when it passed the American Servicemembers' Protection
Act of 2002 ("ASPA"). 88 The ASPA dictates that United States military
89
personal may only operate in theatersI
• ,.
• .. 190 or nations where they are
exempted from the ICC's jurisdiction.
The ASPA, moreover,
prohibits a United States governmental body from cooperating with a
request for cooperation from the ICC, aiding in the transfer of a United
States citizen or permanent resident 19alien
to the ICC, or assisting in the
1
extradition of any person to the ICC.
Since the negotiation of the Rome Treaty, members of Congress, for
reasons discussed earlier, 192 sought to shield both United States civilian
and military personnel from the perceived dangers of an unaccountable

note 156, at art. 1
184. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at pmbl.
185. Rubin, supranote 135, at 158-63.
186. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at pmbl.
187. Contra Scheffer, supranote 18, at 393 ("In the long run, the work of a successful
leader, the strategy that will build a lasting victory in warfare, and the ability to sustain
our dominance in world affairs, will turn on how well we influence the development of
international law and demonstrate our compliance with it rather than on how dismissive
we are of its importance in the shaping of our policies, particularly military policy in
times of conflict.").
188. 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response
to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-206, §§ 2001-2015, 116 Stat.
820, 899-909 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7432) [hereinafter ASPA].
189. The ASPA permits the President of the United States to assign U.S. forces to a
United Nations force, if such assignment is relevant to a compelling United States
national interest. Id. § 2005(c).
190. Id. § 2005; see also Lilian V. Faulhaber, Recent Development, American
Servicemembers'ProtectionAct of 2002, 40 HARV. J.ON LEGIs. 537, 544-45 (2003).

191.
192.

ASPA,supra note 188, § 2004.
See supra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
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and mal-motivated ICC. 193 Efforts by members of Congress to protect
United States personnel through legislation tying United States aid to
foreign nations with immunity from the ICC, moreover, operated
contemporaneously with the United States' efforts to protect its civilian
and military personnel through Article 98 agreements.
By tying foreign aid to the signature of Article 98 agreements,
ASPA effects a significant increase in the leverage of the United States
in its Article 98 agreements negotiations. 9 4 The significance of the
legislative mandate to oppose the ICC and protect United States
personnel from its jurisdiction is the creation of a unified position against
the ICC by the United States.
IV. Conclusion
There is a divergence in the concept of and rationale for Head of
State immunity between the ICC and customary international law. While
customary international law, as recently shaped by the holding in Congo
v. Belgium, increasingly permits a Head of State immunity defense, the
ICC retains its complete denial of an immunity defense.
The ICJ upheld Abdulaye Yerodia's claim to immunity, not to
protect the actions of an individual, but to ensure stability in interstate
relations. Absolute universal jurisdiction, with its potential to allow one
nation to impose its judicial power on another state without actual
interference with a prosecuting state or its nationals, created an
international order where states could use their courts to interfere with
the sovereignty of other nations. The ICJ acted as a check on nations in
order to prevent the creation of a world order not based on the
sovereignty of nations.
The importance of interstate relations has yet to be of consequence
for the ICC because the ICC, contrary to the ICJ, has yet to rule on a
claim of immunity. Because the ICC has yet to claim jurisdiction over
any crime, the only opinions expressed on the applicability of an
immunity defense at the ICC come not from the court itself, but from the
nations who are parties to the court. While customary international law,
as interpreted by the ICJ, supports the retention of a Head of State
immunity defense, the Rome Statute created a world court specifically
crafted to deny all persons a claim to any and every form of immunity.
The United States' Article 98 Agreements, which did not in any
way alter the Rome Treaty, changed the ICC's ability to carry out its
mandate.
By crafting "impunity agreements," the United States
193. House Majority Whip, Tom Delay (R-Tex) spearheaded the drive to pass the
ASPA. See Faulhaber, supra note 190, at 537.
194. Id. at 547.
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frustrated the ICC's goal of holding all persons, regardless of rank or
standing, accountable for universally deplored crimes. The United
States, wishing not to subject itself to the unchecked expansive
jurisdiction of the ICC, seeks to immunize its citizens, officials, and
military personnel from the courts' jurisdiction through bilateral
agreements.
The need for stable interstate relations permeated both the reasoning
of the ICJ in Congo v. Belgium, Belgium's 2003 amendments to its
universal jurisdiction statute, and the text of the United States' Article 98
Agreements. With no check on the discretion of an ICC prosecutor to
pursue investigations contrary to United States' national interests, the
United States employs Article 98 of the Rome Treaty to check ICC
authority. No other organization or nation possesses the ability to act as
a check on the ICC as the ICJ does on national courts, so the United
States imposed its own check on the ICC's idealistic mandate.
Article 98 Agreements, or the so-called "impunity agreements," are
intended to act as a stabilizing force in international relations. Until the
Rome Statute is amended to provide certain immunities, nations-both
parties and non-parties to the Rome Statue-will continue to seek
protection through bilateral agreements. These agreements may diminish
the authority and effectiveness of the ICC, but nations like the United
States consider them necessary for the maintenance of stable
international relations.
If the ICC is to become an international body with the ability to
hold persons in failed regimes accountable for crimes that offend
common international norms, it must be responsive to the pragmatic
needs of interstate relations and respect the sovereignty of nations. Until
that time comes, nations, like the United States, will not and should not
support an organization that does not provide the necessary safeguards
against politically motivated prosecutions, which, when launched against
stable nations, serve only to disrupt interstate relations. If the Rome
Statute is amended to satisfy the concerns of nations like the United
States, then nations may no longer sign agreements that diminish the
authority and effectiveness of the ICC. Only at that time will the ICC be
able to achieve the lofty ideals of its founders.

